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THE CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE RULE AND
HARMLESS ERROR
I. INTRODUCTION
The delicate task facing the appellate courts is to provide for
the judicious administration of disputes and to insure a fair trial.
To be sure, a litigant is not entitled to an errorless trial. Reversal
should be required, however, whenever justice would not be served
and the integrity of the judicial process would be undermined by
affirmation of the trial court. Although these tenets go to the very
essence of the appellate courts' function, they are often given too
little consideration. This indifference is often apparent where an
appeals court summarily dismisses erroneously admitted or ex-
cluded evidence as being "merely cumulative."'
This article will examine the tests used by Missouri appellate
courts to determine the prejudice from error. It will also examine
these standards as they have been applied to specific situations
where evidence, defined as cumulative, has been the subject of
error.
II. HARMLESS ERROR IN GENERAL
It is axiomatic that a judgment will not be reversed unless the
error at the trial level was prejudicial. 2 In deciding whether the error
was harmless or prejudicial, the appellate court must determine the
effect of the error on the verdict.3 To prevent reversals for mere
technical or trivial errors, harmless error statutes have been en-
acted.4 In Missouri, reversal is precluded by statutes unless error
was committed against the appellant "materially affecting the mer-
its of the action."5 As a corollary to these guidelines, it is evident
that the courts are more likely to reverse where the error in admis-
1. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966); Robinson v. Ross, 47 S.W.2d
122 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932).
2. Smith v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 277 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1955).
3. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HAMLEss ERROR 16 (1970).
4. § 512.160(2), RSMo 1969, provides:
No appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it believes that error was
committed by the trial court against the appellant, and materially affecting the
merits of the action.
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970) provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
5. Schraedel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 248 S.W.2d 25, 33 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952),
quoting from § 512.160(2), RSMo 1949.
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sion or exclusion of evidence concerns a vital' or the principal con-
tested issue.' The admission of evidence "entirely immaterial to the
issues and without probative force" 8 cannot constitute prejudicial or
reversible error unless it has a natural tendency to inflame or arouse
hostile passions.'
The proper test for the harm of error has been the subject of
much debate. Justice Traynor advocates that the verdict be re-
versed unless it is "highly probable" that the error did not affect the
judgment.'0 Others advocate that the test for harm should reflect
the standard of proof used at trial." Thus, to assure the same degree
of certainty demanded at trial, reversal would be required in crimi-
nal cases where it is "reasonably possible" that the error affected
the judgment. 2 In civil cases, a less strict standard would require
reversal only where it is probable or more probable than not that
the error affected the decision below.' 3 Missouri purports to follow
different standards for criminal and civil cases. For criminal cases,
Missouri decisions state that "error should not be declared harmless
unless it is so without question." 4 The Missouri test for prejudice
in civil cases has not been clearly stated. The test appears to be
whether the error "had any reasonable tendency to influence the
verdict,"' 5 although the language typically found in the decisions is:
"We cannot say. . . it is unlikely that the testimony was prejudi-
cial.","
The Missouri cases consistently point out that the appellant
has the burden of establishing prejudicial or reversible error.'"
6. See State v. Harris, 64 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Mo. 1933).
7. See Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. En Banc 1962); State
v. Burchett, 302 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Mo. 1957); cf. Martin v. Martinous, 219 S.W.2d 667 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1949) (admission of incompetent evidence cannot be regarded as harmless when it tends
to prove a material issue in the case). See generally Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and
Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VmL. L. REv. 48, 58 (1957).
8. Span v. Jackson, Walker Coal & Mining Co., 16 S.W.2d 190, 200 (Mo. 1929).
9. Kunz v. Munzlinger, 242 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Mo. 1951).
10. TrtAYNOR, supra note 3, at 35, 49.
11. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 999 (1973).
12. Id. at 1021.
13. Id. at 991; TAYNOR, supra note 3, at 29.
14. State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 64 (Mo. En Banc 1972); State v. Hayes, 204
S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo. 1947). See also State v. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512, 74 S.W. 612 (1903).
15. Chester v. Shockley, 304 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. 1957).
16. Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. En Bac 1962). See also
Krez v. Mickel, 431 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1968); Hayes v. Kansas City South. Ry., 260 S.W.2d
491 (Mo. 1953).
17. McCandless v. Manzella, 369 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Mo. 1963); Nash v. Plaza Elect.,




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/13
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE RULE
Where the error concerns the improper admission or rejection of
evidence, however, a differing presumption arises.'" "Incompetent
evidence on a material issue is presumed to be prejudicial . . .
unless clearly shown to be otherwise."' 9 The rule is the same where
competent evidence is excluded. 2 The decisions also state that un-
less the error affirmatively appears to be inconsequential, 21 the bur-
den of showing that the error was harmless is on the respondent. 2
Initially, it is always the duty of the appellant to call attention to
the error in admission or exclusion of evidence and show how it was
prejudicial.2 After this burden is met, the appellant, in theory, is
then aided by the presumed prejudice rule.? Occasionally, reversal
of a decision actually is predicated on the failure of the respondent
to meet his burden of proof in overcoming this presumption of preju-
dice.25 In general, however, it appears that the Missouri courts state
the presumption of prejudice rule where the judgment is to be re-
versed but do not mention it where the incompetent evidence ad-
mitted is considered to be merely cumulative and harmless.
III. CumuLATIv EvIDENcE RULE
A. In General
Under the cumulative evidence rule, the improper admission or
exclusion of evidence which is merely repetitious or duplicative is
deemed harmless error on the theory that it did not affect the ver-
dict. The rule is applicable in a wide variety of situations where
evidence on a certain issue has been admitted during the trial and
other related evidence on the same matter has been improperly
admitted or excluded. For example, the rule has been applied where
one witness testified on a subject and another witness was erro-
neously permitted or prevented from testifying on the same sub-
18. Hamilton v. Missouri Petrol..Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1969); Holmes v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 257 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo. 1953). See also State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid,
333 Mo. 1224, 64 S.W.2d 667 (1933).
19. Hamilton v. Missouri Petrol. Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo. 1969).
20. Reed v. Reed, 101 Mo. App. 176, 70 S.W. 505 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
21. Fred Bauer Engr. & Cont. Co. v. Arctic Ice & Storage Co., 186 Mo. App. 664, 172
S.W. 417 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
22. Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Mo. En Bane 1962).
23. Martin v. Bulgen, 111 S.W.2d 963 (Spr. Mo. App. 1938).
24. Analysis based upon presumptions and burdens of proof is not suited to appellate
review of error. Presumptions and burdens of proof are procedural devices used to expedite
the finding of fact in the trial court. At the appellate level, the court is generally not concerned
with new evidence, but must decide whether the alleged error was prejudicial. Presumptions
and burdens of proof are not needed for this latter task. TAYNOR, supra note 3, at 25, 26.
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ject.3 It has been applied where testimony or an affidavit was ad-
mitted into evidence and a deposition on the same matter was
wrongfully excluded. 2 It also has been applied where pictures of an
injury have been admitted and slides of the same injury have been
excluded.2
Essentially, the cumulative evidence rule is based on the prem-
ise that reversal is not required where there is evidence in the record
which "neutralizes" the prejudice resulting from the improper ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence on the same subject. 29 However, the
error is not harmless in a cumulative sense unless the neutralizing
evidence has the same probative effect as the evidence improperly
excluded or admitted. 0 That is, to be truly cumulative, the evidence
must be of the "same kind tending to prove the same point."' ,
Evidence tending to .prove the existence of a fact circumstantially
is not cumulative of evidence which tends to establish the same fact
directly.2 In addition, the prejudice is not neutralized if the compe-
tent evidence in the record is of less "persuasive quality" or less
likely to impress the jury than the evidence wrongfully excluded or
admitted."
B. Exclusion of Cumulative Evidence
Arguably, the improper exclusion of competent evidence is
more likely to be held prejudicial than the admission of incompetent
evidence, it being more difficult to determine what effect excluded
evidence has on a judgment. 34 However, in Missouri it has been held
that the exclusion of evidence is "harmless where it is merely cumu-
lative"3 and the "same facts" have been shown by other evidence.36
In State v. Nibarger,37 testimony of the defendant's son was
26. See State v. Hardy, 225 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1950).
27. See Spivak v. Spivak, 283 S.W.2d 137 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Barnett v. Western
Union Tele., 287 S.W. 1064 (St. L. Mo. App. 1926).
28. See Long v. Hooker, 443 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1969).
29. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 3 Vim. L. REy. 48, 55 (1957).
30. TRAYNOR, supra note 3, at 70.
31. State v. Harris, 334 Mo. 38, 43, 64 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1933); cf. Rol Miller & Sons,
Inc. v. Schultz Products Co., 418 S.W.2d 721 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967) (Incompentent evidence
is not merely cumulative where it is used to prove a material point not otherwise established).
32. State v. Harris, 334 Mo. 38, 43, 64 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1933).
33. Eichenberg v. Magidson's Estate, 170 S.W.2d 105, 110 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943).
34. See TRAYNOR, supra note 3, at 69.
35. Steele v. Yacovelli, 419 S.W.2d 477, 481 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
36. Long v. Hooker, 443 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Mo. 1969). See also Spivak v. Spivak, 283
S.W.2d 137 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Steffen v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 331 Mo. 574, 56
S.W.2d 47 (1932).
37. 391 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1965).
[Vol. 40
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offered to show an eyewitness' prejudice against the defendant. Al-
though the son's testimony was improperly excluded, the error was
ruled harmless since the defendant and another witness had pre-
viously testified about the defendant's statements to the eyewitness
which resulted in the animosity between them. It was held that,
"the improper rejection of evidence is not prejudicial error when the
same or substantially the same evidence is otherwise admitted. 3
This is so whether such evidence is admitted prior or subsequent to
such rejection. 9 Application of the cumulative evidence rule will
depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Courts must
consider the excluded evidence's materiality to the issues." Accord-
ingly, reversal should be required whenever the excluded evidence
would have been more persuasive than or would have lent needed
corroboration to other evidence in the record."
C. Admission of Cumulative Evidence
The cumulative evidence rule has been more frequently applied
where evidence was improperly admitted. For example, the impro-
per admission of a letter was held harmless error where the subject
matter of the letter was also found in the testimony of witnesses.42
In a criminal case, the improper admission of a witness's testimony
concerning a prior crime by the defendant was not prejudicial error
where the defendant admitted the conviction on cross-
examination.'3 Accurately stated, the rule is: "the admission of im-
proper evidence is harmless where the fact thereby sought to be
shown is otherwise fully and properly established"" by competent
evidence. 5 However, the Missouri courts have also applied this doc-
trine in two collateral areas which are not consistent with the theory
on which the rule is based.
First, Missouri courts have taken the approach that the erro-
neous admission of cumulative evidence will not allow reversal,
"when without it there is ample uncontradicted evidence to support
38. Id. at 849.
39. State v. Wells, 305 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Mo. 1957).
40. Welp v. Bogy, 277 S.W. 600, 604 (St. L. Mo. App. 1925). See also State v. Harris,
334 Mo. 38, 64 S.W.2d 256 (1933), where the court stated that in criminal cases, the judicial
discretion of the trial court concerning cumulative testimony should be cautiously exercised.
Where the evidence tended to more definitely prove the defendant's alibi, it should have been
admitted rather than excluded as being cumulative. Id. at 259.
41. Gibbs, supra note 29, at 59.
42. See Murphy v. Buschman-Jennings, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 29 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
43. See State v. Carpenter, 436 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1969).
44. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 96 (Mo. 1970).
45. Shouse v. Dubinsky, 38 S.W.2d 530, 5e4 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931). See also Thienes v.
Harlin Fruit Co., 499 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973).
1975]
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the judgment and it is apparent that the result would have been the
same without such evidence."4 This approach is similar to the se-
verely' criticized appellate court practice of affirming where the
court is of the opinion that the "judgment was for the right party. '47
The use of either of these tests involves the appellate court in weigh-
ing the evidence without knowledge of the factors which may affect
the credibility and probative value of the testimony." If abused, this
practice deprives the litigant of his right to trial by a jury of his
peers.49
The second questionable approach to the cumulative evidence
rule is used where the appellant has failed to object to the first
introduction of improper evidence. Although the appellant is not
precluded from objecting to like incompetent evidence later, 0 the
court's overruling of this objection is not reversible error." It has
been uniformly held in Missouri that a party "will not be heard to
complain of the admission of testimony over his objection where
testimony of the same tenor ' 52 has previously been admitted
without his objection.53 In Carroll v. Missouri Power & Light Co.,54
the court held that, after a failure to make a proper objection in the
first instance, a second admission of similar excludable evidence
was only cumulative. Though an attempt was made to object to the
first admission of incompetent evidence, the court held that the
attempted objection was too general. The court then reasoned that
since it could not determine which admission of the evidence had
influenced the verdict, admitting the evidence the second time was
not reversible error.5 This rationale seems illogical since both influ-
enced the jury and both were technically inadmissible. Even though
inadmissible evidence once received without objection is given pro-
bative effect as if it were admissible,5" this approach seems incon-
sistent with the cumulative evidence rule since improper evidence
46. Zeppenfeld v. Morgan, 185 S.W.2d 898, 903 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945); Drake v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 333 Mo. 520, 534, 63 S.W.2d 75, 81 (1933).
47. Havens v. Brown, 208 Mo. App. 473, 480, 237 S.W. 126, 128 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
48. TRAYNoR [, supra note 3, at 20.
49. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 1019.
50. Some jurisdictions refuse to allow the second objection. See Rash v. Waterhouse,
124 Vt. 476, 207 A.2d 130 (1965). See generally, C. McComICK, EvDENCE 128 (2d ed. 1972).
51. Powers v. Kansas City, 18 S.W.2d 545, 551-52 (K.C. Mo. App. 1929).
52. Keyes v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. , 31 S.W.2d 50, 62 (Mo. 1930).
53. Bennette v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977, 983, 87 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. 1935).
54. 96 S.W.2d 1074 (K.C. Mo. App. 1936).
55. Id. at 1079.
56. Fellows v. Farmer, 379 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Turner v. Yellow Cab
Co., 361 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962); Edmisten v. Dousette, 334 S.W.2d 746, 753
(Spr. Mo. App. 1960) and cases collected note 13 therein.
[Vol. 40
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is only harmless where it is cumulative of other competent and
admissible evidence in the record. But in not allowing the appellant
to benefit from his failure to object in the first instance, Carroll may
still be properly viewed as an application of the general principle
that a party waives his right to a reversal based on a late objection.
D. Specific Areas of Application
Accepting the principle that improper evidence must be of the
same degree of persuasiveness as the evidence in the record to fall
under the cumulative evidence rule, it has been held that the impro-
per admission of expert testimony is not merely cumulative to lay
testimony on the same matter.5" This situation frequently arises
where a police officer, who was not an eyewitness to an automobile
accident, is improperly permitted to give his opinion as to the point
of impact of the vehicles. This testimony is not "rendered harmless
because it is cumulative of other evidence properly admitted""8 and
reversal is required. 9 However, in State v. Hinojosa,6' a physician's
improper testimony concerning defendant's intoxication was held
harmless where the fact was so "overwhelmingly established by
other testimony," as to make it certain that no prejudice could
possibly have resulted.6
Similarly, problems have arisen where a physician is impro-
perly allowed to testify concerning statements made to him by a
patient concerning his past physical condition or manner in which
an injury was received. As pointed out in Schears v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad,2 even though this testimony may be to the same effect as
competent testimony otherwise in the case, the error must be held
prejudicial 3 because the influence of the physician's testimony on
the jury is unascertainable.64 In the same light, it was held in State
57. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
58. Duncan v. Pinkston, 340 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. 1960).
59. Chester v. Shockley, 304 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1957).
60. 242 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1951).
61. Id at 8. But see State v. Burchett, 302 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1957) (Testimony of officer
that defendant was intoxicated was not merely cumulative and harmless where it was based
on illegal blood test).
62. 355 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
63. See Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. En Banc 1962); Holmes v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1178, 257 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. 1953). But see Hunter v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 315 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1958) (Physician's testimony concerning the past physical
condition of the plaintiff was not prejudicial since it was fully and properly testified to by
plaintiff). Schears states that even though Hunter may allow the admission of a doctor's
opinion, a hearsay statement of a patient concerning his past physical condition is still
prejudicial error if admitted through a physician's testimony. 355 S.W.2d at 319.
64. Zarisky v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. 186 S.W.2d 854 (K.C. Mo. App. 1945).
1975]
7
McCarter: McCarter: umulative vidence Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
v. Degraffenreid5 that admission into evidence of an officer's testi-
mony concerning an eyewitness' identification of the defendant in
a line-up was reversible error. The court reasoned that to hold the
error harmless merely because it was cumulative would be to "indi-
rectly abolish the evidentiary rule against such testimony as it is the
very nature of such testimony to be cumulative."6
There are common characteristics underlying the Schears line
of Missouri cases which have required reversal even though the
improperly admitted evidence duplicated similar evidence properly
admitted in the case. 67 Ostensibly, the reversals have been based on
the respondent's failure to meet his burden of proof to overcome the
presumtpion of prejudice." However, it is also apparent that the
prejudicial evidence in these cases has nearly always been hearsay
statements. Prejudicial error has resulted in an accident case where
a highway patrolman was allowed to testify that the defendant told
him that the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road. 9 In a
condemnation proceeding, it was prejudicial error for a witness to
testify as to statements made by a highway engineer concerning the
value of the defendant's land.71 It should also be noted that the
hearsay statements requiring reversal had a direct bearing on the
principal, paramount, or crucial issue in the case. 71
Cases which cursorily state that the evidence was "clearly cu-
mulative and . . . not prejudicial"7 2 lose sight of the scope of the
rule. Albeit cumulative, every restatement of facts also has indepen-
dent probative value3 and is to some extent corroborative.74 Thus,
as was correctly stated in the concurring opinion to State v.
Degraffenreid,5 "the fact that evidence is cumulative does not auto-
matically make its admission harmless."7 Each case must be exam-
ined "to determine whether the particular cumulative evidence
65. 477 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
66. Id. at 64.
67. Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. En Bane 1962).
68. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Baker, 505 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1974); Hamilton v. Missouri Petrol. Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo. 1969).
69. Hamilton v. Missouri Petrol. Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1969).
70. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Baker, 505 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1974).
71. Id.
72. See Covey v. Van Bibber, 311 S.W.2d 112, 117 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958). See also
Creager v. Chilson, 453 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1970).
73. R. TRAYNOR, THE RmDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 71 (1970).
74. See Hamilton v. Missouri Petrol. Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo. 1969).
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admitted therein was harmless."7 Erroneously admitted evidence
can rarely be deemed harmless where the evidence is closely bal-
anced or affords minimal support for the judgment.7"
IV. CURATIVE ADMISSIBILITY
By referring to error as being "cured" in a cumulative evidence
situation,79 the Missouri courts on occasion have totally confused
the curative admissibility doctrine with the cumulative evidence
rule. 0 The theories, however, are very different.
In general, where one party introduces inadmissible evience,
the doctrine of curative admissibility allows the opposing party to
thereafter introduce similar incompetent evidence solely to meet
and negate the effect of the prior incompetent evidence.8 ' For exam-
ple, if the plaintiff improperly questions a police officer-not an
eyewitness to the accident-on his opinion as to the point of impact
of the vehicles, the defendant may cross-examine the policeman as
to his estimate of the speed of the plaintiff's car. 2 The rationale is
that the first party having "opened the door" to incompetent evi-
dence on the issue of the cause of the accident, he is estopped from
preventing his opponent's rebuttal."
The elements of the Missouri curative admissibility rule are
well defined.8 5 First, the original evidence must have been admitted
without objection so that the opposing party's only recourse is cura-
tive evidence.88 Second, the curative rebuttal must have been con-
77. Id.
78. TRAYNOR, supra note 71. Degraffenreid also stated, however, that error "may be
disregarded as harmless when the evidence of guilt is strong." 477 S.W.2d at 65. Query
whether this statement is not an example of the approach criticized in the text accompanying
notes 46-49 supra.
79. See State v. Koelzer, 154 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1941).
80. See State v. Baldwin, 399 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1966). The court incorrectly held that
the admission of hearsay evidence was harmless under the doctrine of "curative admissibil-
ity" since the same matter was established by other evidence admitted without objection or
contradiction. Id. at 24.
81. For an excellent analysis of this doctrine see Beck, Evidence-CurativeAdmissibil-
ity in Missouri, 32 Mo. L. REv. 505 (1967).
82. See Young v. Dueringer, 401 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
83. See C. McCORMcK, EVIDENCE 131 (2d Ed. 1972).
84. Beck, supra note 79, at 515. See Larabee Flour Mills v. West Plains Comm'n Co.,
216 Mo. App. 257, 262 S.W. 389 (Spr. Ct. App. 1924).
85. Beck, supra note 79, at 514. The foundation cases for the modem Missouri rule are
Young v. Dueringer, 401 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966), and Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 250 S.W.2d 859 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
86. In theory, the objection would save the appellant on appeal so there is no need to
allow similar inadmissible evidence. Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Spr. Mo. -App.
1969). McCormick, however, states that the remedy by objecting is inadequate and the party
1975]
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fined to the evidential point or fact to which the original evidence
was directed. 7 Third, the court must find that the curative evidence
was required to neutralize and contradict an unfair advantage
gained by the opposing party's use of the original improper evi-
dence.8 The curative evidence must be confined to the same issue. 9
If the plaintiff improperly brings in evidence associating the defen-
dant with the consumption of alcohol, curative admissibility does
not allow the defendant to thereby attack the plaintiff's drinking
habits."0
Underlying the curative admissibility doctrine is the policy that
one party should not be allowed to profit from his own violation of
evidentiary rules.9 Thus, his opponent is allowed to use similar
incompetent evidence to meet the prior incompetent evidence which
was admitted without objection.2 Application of the true cumula-
tive evidence rule, on the other hand, is not based on possible profit-
ing from a violation of court rules. Under the cumulative evidence
rule, either the improper admission or the improper exclusion of
evidence may be deemed harmless error where the same fact was
established either prior or subsequent to the error by other compe-
tent evidence. Thus curative admissibility involves an opponent's
retaliation with like incompetent evidence while the cumulative
evidence rule involves the duplication of the incompetent evidence
by the same party. Further more, curative admissibility is a doc-
trine which may be consciously applied by the trial court, whereas
the cumulative evidence rule is an appellate level concept.
should be given a fair opportunity to win the case at trial with curative evidence. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 81, at 132.
87. Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); Dor v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 250 S.W.2d 859, 866 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952). The rule does not permit the
indiscriminate introduction of like evidence touching other issues. Id. It is not totally clear,
however, how closely the curative evidence must be confined to the same evidentiary fact.
For example, in Young v. Dueringer, 401 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966), the court allowed
defendant to question a non-eyewitness police officer as to his estimate of the speed of
plaintiff's car. Plaintiff had first improperly asked for the officer's opinion regarding the point
of impact of the vehicles. The court of appeals applied the curative admissibility rule, stating
that the curative evidence was of the "same general caliber" as the original improper evi-
dence. Id. at 167.
88. Ferguson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 442 S.W.2d 549, 554 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
89. See, C. McCoRmxcK, supra note 81, at 133.
90. See Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
91. Beck, supra note 79, at 517.
92. In contrast, the rule in Carroll v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 96 S.W.2d 1074 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1936), allows the same party to introduce like incompetent evidence a second time
where his opponent has failed to object the first time. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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If properly defined and applied, the cumulative evidence rule
is an appropriate standard for appellate review. However, it should
not be applied casually with only lip service given to its require-
ments. The evidence in question should be truly cumulative and of
the same persuasive quality as that in the record. This is especially
true in criminal cases where-given the beyond reasonable doubt
standard required for conviction--an error in admission or exclusion
of evidence may well have "tipped the scales" against the defen-
dant.13 Since it takes little to constitute the requisite doubt for
acquittal,94 the risk that improperly excluded or admitted evidence
is not cumulative should be borne primarily by the State unless the
evidence of guilt on that issue is strong. In any event, the cumula-
tive evidence rule should be applied consistent with its underlying
rationale. Appellate courts should not first form their opinions and
then justify it with the use of a meaningless verbal formula.
W. DUDLEY MCCARTER
93. State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 64 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
94. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988, 1004 (1973).
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